THE OMBUDSMAN CONFIGURATION, PRONE TO CORRUPTION
According to Dr. Robert Klitgaard, a known expert on corruption, corruption is composed of three elements:
§ Monopoly
§ Discretion
§ Lack of Accountability
Mathematically, C = M + D – A
Or
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
It makes real good sense that an environment where there is monopoly (of power, service, authority and the likes), discretion and lack of accountability leads to corruption.
Monopoly and discretion often go hand in hand. With monopoly, it almost always follows that there is discretionary power that the single firm can exercise. The single firm has the discretion to set the prices and standards of services just because there is no alternative for the ‘client’ (the public). And the client has no choice. When there is so much discretion, there is that tendency and propensity to abuse the power that one has. This is further aggravated by the lack of accountability. Even if there is that propensity to abuse power if there are accountability mechanisms in place, that propensity is reduced because there is that credible threat of getting punished. So without accountability, the propensity to abuse power increases.
Looking at the Office of the Ombudsman and analyzing its configuration and its place in the Philippine governance framework, I realize that all the elements that make corruption possible are present. This is the irony of all ironies. The Ombudsman, contrary to its nature as an anti-corruption agency, is actually a fertile ground for corruption to happen at the organizational level.
Monopoly. Only the Office of the Ombudsman does what it does. There is no other agency that can do its service.
Discretion. Because the Ombudsman has that monopoly of power, it can set its own standard to doing its job. It can define ‘probable cause’ to be this and not that. It just did anyway in the COMELEC-MegaPacific case.
Accountability. The only accountability mechanism in place for the head of the Office of the Ombudsman is the impeachment process. The Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body. Independence it seems is a double-edged sword. If independence means for the Ombudsman to become an effective check and balance against abuses in government, then that’s good. But if independence means for it to be not answerable to anybody when the Ombudsman abuses its power, then there is something seriously wrong.
These elements are very much present in the Ombudsman as shown in its resolution on the COMELEC-MegaPacific case. The Ombudsman’s resolution does not demonstrate very directly a corruption incidence. It strongly points at the Office’s vulnerability to becoming corrupt because of the strong presence of these elements.
Now, there is a petition at the Supreme Court for the review of the Ombudsman’s resolution/ decision on the COMELEC-MegaPacific case. In our analysis, should the Supreme Court find that there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, the most that the Supreme Court can do is remand the case to the Ombudsman for it to do its job again – investigate the case properly. The Supreme Court can’t do the Ombudsman’s job. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, can very well argue that it is an independent body and that the Supreme Court is overstepping its mandate. That may be a valid argument in favor of the Ombudsman. Indeed, it will appear that way because constitutionally, it is only the Ombudsman that can do that kind of job.
We also note that the Ombudsman had been very arbitrary in its definition of ‘probable cause.’ Probable cause changes definition depending on whether the case is aligned to some agenda that the OMB protects. We’ve seen that the OMB used a different standard for probable cause in a similar case.
It’s a shame how the configuration of the Ombudsman makes it highly vulnerable to corruption and the highest form of corruption at that – political corruption. In the end, we become hostage to again the over-used, over-rated POLITICAL WILL (of the one on top).