I think I've reached an answer this time.
Have appointments watch projects changed anything in the governance landscape?
From an INSTITUTIONAL REFORM perspective, I dare say YES. The appointments watch projects have successfully advanced transparency and accountability in key stages of the appointment process.
The JBC public interviews have become more transparent than before. Now, the public interviews allow the general public to view the proceedings. Those that cannot be accommodated by the small hearing room can view the proceedings from outside through a projection screen and a good audio system. We can now bring our mobile phones inside the room and blast out text messages for updates. We can also bring our laptops and tweet updates about the interview.
The JBC voting process has also become more transparent and subsequently should make it easier for the public to exact accountability from the JBC. The votes are now published. Further, the individual votes of the JBC members are made known to the public. We now know who voted for whom.
Of course, there is yet a lot more to be done to institutionalize reforms that advance transparency and accountability in the entire appointments process.
From a POLITICAL ECONOMY perspective, we cannot claim success. However, I would not say that there is no impact at all. Suffice it to say that the project did not really aim to influence the President's decision as the appointing power. Only in one project did we put forward names of individuals to be considered by the President - the Comelec Appointments Watch. There were no lobby efforts also.
While we haven't really looked in this area more closely, I think somehow the project has made a dent in the political economy of appointments (perhaps theoretically). Theoretically, if we have been visible enough to have gotten the President's attention, whether by making the issue more known to the public or through the media, we'd have influenced the INCENTIVES STRUCTURE of the appointments-making process. The appointments watch projects will have factored in the decision-making battle of the President. Oftentimes, the President has a diminishing political capital. S/he starts with her highest possible political capital upon election and then after spends this on difficult decisions s/he makes as the chief executive of government. Theoretically, if the appointments watch projects have made the appointments issue a people's issue, then the President's decision to appoint will be weighed more carefully in terms of the available political capital of the President. Questions like "Is making a bad appointment worth that much political capital to be spent?" will be asked. "OR will the appointment improve the President's political capital?"
This, to my mind, is the value of the appointments watch project in the political economy.
